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Nuclear power plants have well-defined processes to acquire and qualify safety-critical 
systems. Ultimate goal is to maximise safety, without compromises in quality and reliability. 
Each new device and system in nuclear power plant shall be classified and qualified 
according to its safety requirements. Using modern technology means in practice that more 
and more components have programmable features. The reliability of such components has 
proven to be difficult to demonstrate due to the nature of flaws in software.  
Standards and guides used by national authorities set licensing criteria for software used in 
the safety-critical systems of nuclear power plants. Nuclear power companies use 
commonly same standards and guides as authorities to avoid interpretation problems in 
qualification and licensing. Standards can be either generic, safety specific of nuclear 
domain specific. Also system manufacturers and software development units have adopted 
either nuclear domain specific of generic safety standards. Prerequisites for high-quality 
software and systems are in place.  
Conformance with standards is not any absolute guarantee for safety. It can be achieved 
only by use of several different approaches, which all provide their own evidences and 
support for qualification and licensing. Certification is one way to package different 
methods together and build trust in achievement of maximal safety. In fact, certification is 
already de-facto “must” in highest safety category of software intensive safety-critical 
systems.  
Certification should be aligned with system acquisition, development and commissioning 
processes to improve total effectiveness of qualification. Then it is also cost-effective and 
proactive rather than additional and isolated activity. 
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As a part of Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR2010, a project called CERFAS has defined 
necessary software certification services for nuclear industry needs. Main areas of the service are 
process assessment and product evaluation. Certification employs also several other method 
families, like inspections and reviews, independent V&V, model checking, conformance with 
selected reference standard(s) and use of selected measurements and analyses. Safety case is the 
main framework to integrate all methods together.  
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1. Introduction 
When the first versions of nuclear specific system and software standards were written some 20 – 
25 years ago, no generic software and quality standards like ISO/IEC 15504 (Process 
Assessment) or IEC/EN ISO 61508 (Functional Safety) existed or were not commonly known. So, 
each party developed their own criteria and terminology for their own needs.  
Quite typically, nuclear power instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are industrial 
products and are not designed and manufactured uniquely for each application. Their 
platform is based on standard solutions and may be developed for many different purposes. 
Some subsystems may be old and not easy to qualify during the system delivery. The main 
evidence may be their historical development process and current operational history. They 
have many versions and variants and new changes to come. Only some minor part of the 
whole delivered system may consist of customer-specific application. When the system will 
be delivered into the nuclear power unit, it may require separate qualification of platform 
and application. As a whole, complete qualification can be very time-consuming and 
expensive. 
As a result of the described development, there is clear need for an integrated and effective 
method to qualify software intensive systems in nuclear power units. Integration has three 
major areas: 1) Definition and harmonisation of requirements for software intensive systems 
in their different safety levels, 2) Integration of several approaches like SPICE and Failure 
mode effects and criticality analysis method, FMECA, to improve confidence of qualification 
and 3) Integration of the system acquisition and qualification processes to improve total 
effectiveness of the acquisition, delivery and commissioning processes.  
Certification of software intensive systems can help in qualification. Because certification is very 
rigor and expensive process, it is needed mainly for most safety-critical systems and components. 
Certification of software is often limited to platform components. Certificate is normally valid for 
any further use of same software version, and can reduce certification cost per delivery.  
The objective of SPICE method is to evaluate the process capability. SPICE is a brand name 
for ISO/IEC 15504 Process Assessment standard. The capability measurement system is 
based on ordinal 5-point capability level scale. Basically any process can be evaluated using 
the measurement system. In most cases, some predefined process reference model is used. 
Most known models are defined by ISO itself. ISO/IEC 12207 is the standard for software 
life-cycle processes. ISO/IEC 15288 is similar model for systems engineering. In most cases 
I&C systems for nuclear power plants are developed using a combination of software and 
systems engineering processes. 
A modified FMECA method Tiira [9] has been used to bring evidence to the qualification 
process of safety-critical system. FMECA is effective to focus in most critical parts of the 
system, which have highest potential to cause failures. In hardware components, many well-
defined methods can be used to show evidence about reliability and potential to failures. 
Redundancy can be used to reach required reliability and failure prevention level. For 
software-intensive components standard FMECA is less applicable, because software failure 
statistics is typically incomplete. Instead of statistics, target values for software reliability are 
used in Tiira. Software reliability and probability of failures to occur may be difficult to 
predict, even to calculate.  
 
2. Overview of the requirements for qualification  
2.1 Classification of systems according to safety 
STUK (Säteilyturvakeskus, The Finnish Radiaton and Nuclear Safety Authority) has defined 
four safety class levels for nuclear power unit (SC1 … SC4, SC1 being the highest). IEC 61508 
defines four safety integrity levels (SIL1 … SIL 4, SIL4 being the highest). Some other 
standards have defined for example safety classes 1, 2 and 3 for systems, and safety 
categories A, B and C for functions. There is no clear mutual compatibility between various 
nuclear specific standards and their safety classifications. Also criteria and requirements to 
validate achievement of the defined safety class can be different. National regulators as 
STUK want to define their own requirements for the qualification process, to be able to carry 
out their monitoring and regulatory role. 
Qualification of software intensive systems for nuclear power plant is needed in two 
different kind of contexts: 
 Qualification of safety-critical systems. The main software reference standard is 
IEC 60880. Certification is often part of qualification (see section 7), especially for 
platform components. Safety category is mostly „A“, as defined in IEC 60880. SIL 
classification is normally not used directly, so SIL can be anything between 1– 4. 
Main focus is in product certification rather than process assessment, because of 
IEC 60880 and lisencing requirements. 
 Qualification of safety-related systems. The main software reference standard is 
IEC 62138. Systems are normally industrial products, which can be used also in 
nuclear power plants after their qualification. Certification is normally not required 
in Finland for these systems, classified either in category B or C. Focus is mainly in 
process assessment, because of easier IEC 62138 and lisencing requirements.  
Generic functional safety standard IEC 61508 uses term "safety-related” for any system. It 
can be used as additional reference and guidance for all kind of systems for nuclear power 
plants, belonging in safety category A, B or C. The term “safety system” should be used in 
category A systems. 
One method for qualification of safety-related systems for nuclear power plants is called TVO 
SWEP (Software evaluation procedure). It has been developed originally during 2004 – 2006 as a 
joint effort of TVO, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland and Finnish Software 
Measurement Association FiSMA. Main focus is systems in safety categories B and C. This article 
is mainly based on experiences from TVO SWEP in several deliveries for TVO.  
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During years 2007 – 2010 TVO SWEP was extended to safety-critical systems in safety category 
A. Many additional methods and techniques are needed to get required evidence. Quantitative 
understanding of product and safety is achieved by applying formal methods, like safety case.  
 
2.2 Pre-qualification and qualification 
The main phases of the qualification are pre-qualification and application qualification. 
SPICE is used mainly in the pre-qualification phase, together with relevant nuclear specific 
standards. Often pre-qualification covers the term certification. If needed, also application 
qualification is done, partly with the same methods. As a starting point, preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA) is done as part of the user requirements definition step. A modified FMECA 
[9] method is used after PHA, and is maintained and completed during all qualification 
steps. Figure 1 shows the main steps of qualification and how it is integrated to main steps 
of system acquisition and development.  
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 Fig. 1. The qualification process, integrated with I&C system acquisition 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, qualification is based on a detailed qualification plan. A typical input 
is PHA based on user requirements. It is very important to define safety requirements early 
in the acquisition process for each safety or safety-related function. When that is defined, the 
detailed qualification plan and tailoring of questionnaires can be done according to 
requirements.  
Typically, the qualification needs a lot of technical data from system suppliers. Therefore the 
pre-qualification phase and necessary negotiations with system suppliers is in parallel with 
qualification planning. The suppliers are informed about the qualification, and are prepared 
to participate if needed.  
Pre-qualification is meaningful to perform in full scale, if the system platform and the 
application are quite large systems and have typically several safety or safety-related 
functions. For small systems some less effort-intensive methods are used if possible. The 
pre-qualification is mainly a combination of detailed and evolved PHA, process assessment 
and conformance checks against necessary nuclear specific standards. Necessary documents 
are reviewed as part of assessment. Also verification and validation of technical documents 
and their safety functions are an essential part of the pre-qualification.  
Qualification during application and system development is done when needed. As a 
process, it is quite similar as the pre-qualification. In most cases it includes further checks of 
system and application details. Also some additional requirements may evolve from 
selected normative standards. They may be identified during pre-qualification, but need 
more attention and evidence. Some typical topics are control of tests and their coverage 
during application development, and handling of system changes for each application.  
 
3. ISO-based process assessment  
ISO 15504 Part 5 (known as the SPICE model) is used in as the main source of process 
assessment in TVO SWEP method. The latest published ISO standard version ISO 15504 Part 
5 is used as the baseline. Part 5 has all ISO 12207 processes and not all of them are relevant 
for qualification purposes. Many nuclear specific standards include quite similar concepts of 
processes as ISO 15504 Part 5, and they are also used as normative sources.  
The workflow for process assessment shall satisfy ISO/IEC 15504 Part 2 requirements to be 
acceptable for qualification purpose. Workflow can be seen as combination of stakeholder 
responsibilities and main assessment phases. Figure 2 illustrates a typical workflow.  
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understanding of product and safety is achieved by applying formal methods, like safety case.  
 
2.2 Pre-qualification and qualification 
The main phases of the qualification are pre-qualification and application qualification. 
SPICE is used mainly in the pre-qualification phase, together with relevant nuclear specific 
standards. Often pre-qualification covers the term certification. If needed, also application 
qualification is done, partly with the same methods. As a starting point, preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA) is done as part of the user requirements definition step. A modified FMECA 
[9] method is used after PHA, and is maintained and completed during all qualification 
steps. Figure 1 shows the main steps of qualification and how it is integrated to main steps 
of system acquisition and development.  
 
Acquisition and Qualification - Integrated Process Diagram
Int
eg
rat
ed
 Ac
qu
isit
ion
 an
d Q
ua
lific
atio
n
Qualification Planning Process
System Acquisition and Development Processes
Qualification Performance Process
Acceptance
of Conceptual
Design Plan
Lin
ks
Offering
Conceptual
Design Plan
System
development
and delivery
Contract Systemdelivery
Preliminary/
Final offers
Offer
request(s)
Conceptual
Design
Identification
of alternative
solutions
Negotiations
with
Suppliers
Supplier
Selection
Investment
Decision
Operation
Technical and
Cost Estimation
Qualification
Planning
Definition of
Qualification
Method
Detailed
Qualification
Planning
Pre-
Qualification
Application/
Delivery
Qualification
Acceptance
of
Qualification
Results
Acquisition
Need
Preliminary
Qualification
Plan
PHA
Detailed
Qualification
Plan
Application
Qualification
Results
Acceptance
to use
Permission to
operate
Process
Assessment
Safety
Evaluation
Pre-
Qualification
Results
Preliminary
Hazard
Analysis
User Reqs
Spec
User Req´s
Specification
& Analysis
Authority
Acceptance
Authority
Acceptance
Application
Qualification
Overall
requirements
specification
 Fig. 1. The qualification process, integrated with I&C system acquisition 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, qualification is based on a detailed qualification plan. A typical input 
is PHA based on user requirements. It is very important to define safety requirements early 
in the acquisition process for each safety or safety-related function. When that is defined, the 
detailed qualification plan and tailoring of questionnaires can be done according to 
requirements.  
Typically, the qualification needs a lot of technical data from system suppliers. Therefore the 
pre-qualification phase and necessary negotiations with system suppliers is in parallel with 
qualification planning. The suppliers are informed about the qualification, and are prepared 
to participate if needed.  
Pre-qualification is meaningful to perform in full scale, if the system platform and the 
application are quite large systems and have typically several safety or safety-related 
functions. For small systems some less effort-intensive methods are used if possible. The 
pre-qualification is mainly a combination of detailed and evolved PHA, process assessment 
and conformance checks against necessary nuclear specific standards. Necessary documents 
are reviewed as part of assessment. Also verification and validation of technical documents 
and their safety functions are an essential part of the pre-qualification.  
Qualification during application and system development is done when needed. As a 
process, it is quite similar as the pre-qualification. In most cases it includes further checks of 
system and application details. Also some additional requirements may evolve from 
selected normative standards. They may be identified during pre-qualification, but need 
more attention and evidence. Some typical topics are control of tests and their coverage 
during application development, and handling of system changes for each application.  
 
3. ISO-based process assessment  
ISO 15504 Part 5 (known as the SPICE model) is used in as the main source of process 
assessment in TVO SWEP method. The latest published ISO standard version ISO 15504 Part 
5 is used as the baseline. Part 5 has all ISO 12207 processes and not all of them are relevant 
for qualification purposes. Many nuclear specific standards include quite similar concepts of 
processes as ISO 15504 Part 5, and they are also used as normative sources.  
The workflow for process assessment shall satisfy ISO/IEC 15504 Part 2 requirements to be 
acceptable for qualification purpose. Workflow can be seen as combination of stakeholder 
responsibilities and main assessment phases. Figure 2 illustrates a typical workflow.  
 
Process Assessment Process, typical  workflow
SP
ICE
 Pr
oc
es
s D
iag
ram
Assessment Initiation and 
Planning Phase Data Collection Phase Reporting Phase
Ma
in 
lin
ks
Method
Adjustment
Detailed
Interview 
Schedule
Assessment 
Reporting
Briefings for 
participants
Assessment 
Purpose 
Definition
Acceptance 
of 
Assessment 
Results
Assessment 
Planning
On-Site 
Interviews 
Data 
Validation
Process 
Rating
Briefings for 
assessment 
team
Assessment 
Scope 
Definition
Document collection 
and review
Assessment 
Plan and 
Scope
Assessment 
Report
Assessment 
Evidences &  
Findings
Guidance
Assessment 
Method and 
Tool
 Fig. 2. A typical work flow of process assessment according to ISO/IEC 15504 
www.intechopen.com
Nuclear Power84
The list of most relevant SPICE processes for qualification needs is presented in table 1. Not all 
SPICE processes are as relevant as others, and also the cost-effectiveness of process assessment 
indicates rather a short than complete list. The criterion for process selection has been alignment 
and integration of ISO 12207 processes and related nuclear specific standards in Table 1. 
 
Process Name  Main areas of integration with nuclear specific standards 
ENG.1 Requirements elicitation Detailed specification of safety functions and their SIL type 
according to PHA analysis results. Requirements for system 
testing. 
ENG.2 System requirements 
analysis 
Validation of each requirement, separate handling of safety 
requirements. Traceability. 
ENG.3 System Architecture 
design 
Allocation of each safety function. Overall architecture of 
the system. System validation planning.  
ENG.4 Software requirements 
analysis 
Specification and independent validation of each software 
function related to safety 
ENG.5 Software design Similarly as ENG.4. Planning of software verification tests.  
ENG.6 Software construction Module testing and documentation. Avoidance of 
unnecessary code. 
ENG.7 Software integration Test records. Validation of integration test results. 
ENG.8 Software testing Test records. Validation of software testing results.  
ENG.9 System integration Test records. Validation of system integration test results.  
ENG.10 System testing Test records. Validation of system test results.  
ENG.11 Software installation Installation test. Correct technical environment. 
SUP.1 Quality assurance Quality planning. Reviews and inspections at project level.  
SUP.2 Verification Independent tests and technical reviews. 
SUP.3 Validation Independent FAT and SAT tests. 
SUP.7 Documentation Done according to supplier’s process and safety 
requirements. 
SUP.8 Configuration 
management 
Full traceability. Change control. 
SUP.9 Problem resolution 
management 
Full audit trail. Analysis of each defect and it´s impacts. 
Common causes of failures.  
SUP.10 Change request 
management 
Full change records. Analysis of each change.  
MAN.3 Project management Quality planning. Verification and validation planning.  
MAN.4 Quality management Quality management activities according to supplier’s 
process. 
MAN.5 Risk management Avoidance of product related risks.  
MAN.6 Measurement Measurement-based testing and validation, if possible. 
Table 1. List of typical SPICE processes used in process assessment and qualification 
 
Each process is assessed up to capability level 3 or higher, if possible. Level 3 is considered 
as the required capability level, because only standard processes and an organisation-wide 
quality system is required for product oriented assessment in safety critical and –related 
systems. Some processes need a lot of refinements and elaborations to comply with safety-
critical system context, and that is done as part of integration of SPICE and nuclear specific 
standards. In most cases, an interpretation of each SPICE element is not enough, also 
extension of the processes with additional practices or alternative checklists are needed.  
The result of SPICE assessment is a capability level for each process and a number of 
evidences. They can be used as “mass evidence” for more detailed safety analysis. SPICE 
capability level is not always the best way to express the real capability of each process. 
Therefore also an “capability index” is calculated as a ratio of evaluated practices and their 
sum compared to target level of the process.  
Conformance against nuclear specific standards and their safety requirements is done 
mainly in parallel with SPICE assessment. Most requirements are used as interpretation 
rules of base and generic practices of each SPICE process. Also complementary methods and 
evaluations are needed, especially in software and system validation. 
 
4. Additional requirements for process assessment of safety-critical systems 
4.1 Basic types of assessment 
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 Fig. 3. Typical sequence of different process assessments (yellow boxes) during qualification 
and certification of safety-critical software 
 
In CERFAS, we have specified three different basic types and “use cases” of process 
assessment (see figure 3). They are needed typically as a sequence: 
 Short “ability assessment” to check overall readiness to develop and deliver safety-
critical software. If overall ability of software organisation is low, then it leads to 
cancellation of the certification process or additional time to restart it. Document 
review is an essential part of this kind of light assessment. 
 Full-scale “certification assessment” to support preliminary software qualification 
and provide evidence for software assurance and safety case during software 
certification process.  
 “Gap fulfilment assessment” to prevent and fix potential causes of non-
conformances of products and processes and their related risks when identified 
during certification process.  
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management 
Full change records. Analysis of each change.  
MAN.3 Project management Quality planning. Verification and validation planning.  
MAN.4 Quality management Quality management activities according to supplier’s 
process. 
MAN.5 Risk management Avoidance of product related risks.  
MAN.6 Measurement Measurement-based testing and validation, if possible. 
Table 1. List of typical SPICE processes used in process assessment and qualification 
 
Each process is assessed up to capability level 3 or higher, if possible. Level 3 is considered 
as the required capability level, because only standard processes and an organisation-wide 
quality system is required for product oriented assessment in safety critical and –related 
systems. Some processes need a lot of refinements and elaborations to comply with safety-
critical system context, and that is done as part of integration of SPICE and nuclear specific 
standards. In most cases, an interpretation of each SPICE element is not enough, also 
extension of the processes with additional practices or alternative checklists are needed.  
The result of SPICE assessment is a capability level for each process and a number of 
evidences. They can be used as “mass evidence” for more detailed safety analysis. SPICE 
capability level is not always the best way to express the real capability of each process. 
Therefore also an “capability index” is calculated as a ratio of evaluated practices and their 
sum compared to target level of the process.  
Conformance against nuclear specific standards and their safety requirements is done 
mainly in parallel with SPICE assessment. Most requirements are used as interpretation 
rules of base and generic practices of each SPICE process. Also complementary methods and 
evaluations are needed, especially in software and system validation. 
 
4. Additional requirements for process assessment of safety-critical systems 
4.1 Basic types of assessment 
 
Ability 
assessment
Process assessment as 
part of
Pre-Qualification 
(including typically 
conformance with 
standards)
Product Certification
(based typically on assurance, V&V and
safety case)
Gap Fulfilment 
Assessment 
(optional)
Gap 
Fulfillment 
Re-
Certification 
(optional)
Business and 
qualification 
requirements
 Fig. 3. Typical sequence of different process assessments (yellow boxes) during qualification 
and certification of safety-critical software 
 
In CERFAS, we have specified three different basic types and “use cases” of process 
assessment (see figure 3). They are needed typically as a sequence: 
 Short “ability assessment” to check overall readiness to develop and deliver safety-
critical software. If overall ability of software organisation is low, then it leads to 
cancellation of the certification process or additional time to restart it. Document 
review is an essential part of this kind of light assessment. 
 Full-scale “certification assessment” to support preliminary software qualification 
and provide evidence for software assurance and safety case during software 
certification process.  
 “Gap fulfilment assessment” to prevent and fix potential causes of non-
conformances of products and processes and their related risks when identified 
during certification process.  
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4.2 Ability assessment 
Ability assessment is typically quite short, even only some days of effort. It can vary a lot, 
depending on the current level of software organisation and its products. Typical examples 
are:  
 Assessment of software development processes (mainly ENG category in ISO/IEC 
15504 Part 5).  
 Review of core documentation or documents from a chosen specific topic, as 
evidences of process capability and conformance with selected reference 
standard(s). 
 Conformance with selected reference standard(s), for example IEC 61508 Part 3, 
IEC 62138 or IEC 60880.  
Quite often ability assessment is also a combination of several topics. To avoid heaviness 
and complexity of ability assessment, typical combination is only with two topics. An 
example could be conformance check + current implementation of bi-directional traceability.  
 
4.3 Full-scale process assessment  
Process assessment in CERFAS context is quite normal, SPICE – type process. Of course, it is 
more formal than most improvement oriented assessments. Evidences are collected and 
recorded systematically, and they are a solid basis for data collection, validation and ratings. 
Rigour of assessment is near to Scampi-A method in strictness and formalism [ARC1.2]. 
Results are reported as gaps to target level. Each gap can be classified by magnitude and 
risk, as defined in [ISO/IEC 15504-4].  
One additional stakeholder in process assessment is the certification body. Typical 
responsiblity is that customer organisation orders certification from a certification body. 
They decide together which references and methods are used in certification. One basic 
requirement is independent team for process assessment. Each team member has to fulfil 
competence requirements. Stakeholders and their relationships in qualification/certification 
driven process assessment are presented in figure 4.  
One other additional requirement is satisfaction of accreditation rules. They are defined in 
ISO17020 family of standards. Most requirements for process assessment are same as for 
management system standards (for example ISO 9001). Assessment process must be 
documented and include competence requirements. Assessment must contain audit trail 
between assessment phases and intermediate results. Finally, if assessment leads to process 
certificate, it must be publicly available for intended audience.  
Most of accreditation requirements are built in process assessment standards and models. 
Both SPICE and CMMI model families have such guidance. A specific variant of full-scale 
process assessment is use of CMMI safety extension as a reference model [+SAFE]. It has 
two process areas focused on safety, namely Safety Management and Safety Engineering. 
 Fig. 4. Stakeholders, their main activities and typical workflow in qualification/certification 
oriented process assessment and conformance evaluation 
 
ISO working group for process assessment [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC7/WG10] is developing a new 
reference and assessment model for safety related software domain, called ISO/IEC 15504 
Part 10: Safety extension [ISO/IEC 15504-10]. The assessment model includes three new 
processes to be assessed. Two processes, Safety Management and Safety Engineering, follow 
the contents of CMMI safety extension. The third process, Tool Qualification, explicitly 
stresses the importance of the tools used to build safety related software. The assessment 
model is aligned with some selected safety standards. At the time of writing those are 
ISO/IEC 26262, IEC 61508, IEC 60880 and UK MoD Def Stan 00-56. In addition to the new 
processes, there will be also guidance on how to interpret software engineering processes of 
ISO/IEC 15504-5 and -6 in an assessment in safety related domain. 
 
4.4 Gap fulfilment assessment 
Third basic type of process assessment in CERFAS context is check of process improvements 
needed to get product certificate. This is needed in such cases that software is incomplete or 
erroneous during any phase of certification. Typical example could be design errors found 
during independent tests. Then the software organisation needs to change specification 
and/or design process so that errors can be prevented in advance or detected during design 
phase. Typical process improvement would be better inspection or quality assurance during 
early phases of software lifecycle. Sometimes also more formal process would be needed, 
maybe with model checking type quality assurance. These changes in development process 
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4.2 Ability assessment 
Ability assessment is typically quite short, even only some days of effort. It can vary a lot, 
depending on the current level of software organisation and its products. Typical examples 
are:  
 Assessment of software development processes (mainly ENG category in ISO/IEC 
15504 Part 5).  
 Review of core documentation or documents from a chosen specific topic, as 
evidences of process capability and conformance with selected reference 
standard(s). 
 Conformance with selected reference standard(s), for example IEC 61508 Part 3, 
IEC 62138 or IEC 60880.  
Quite often ability assessment is also a combination of several topics. To avoid heaviness 
and complexity of ability assessment, typical combination is only with two topics. An 
example could be conformance check + current implementation of bi-directional traceability.  
 
4.3 Full-scale process assessment  
Process assessment in CERFAS context is quite normal, SPICE – type process. Of course, it is 
more formal than most improvement oriented assessments. Evidences are collected and 
recorded systematically, and they are a solid basis for data collection, validation and ratings. 
Rigour of assessment is near to Scampi-A method in strictness and formalism [ARC1.2]. 
Results are reported as gaps to target level. Each gap can be classified by magnitude and 
risk, as defined in [ISO/IEC 15504-4].  
One additional stakeholder in process assessment is the certification body. Typical 
responsiblity is that customer organisation orders certification from a certification body. 
They decide together which references and methods are used in certification. One basic 
requirement is independent team for process assessment. Each team member has to fulfil 
competence requirements. Stakeholders and their relationships in qualification/certification 
driven process assessment are presented in figure 4.  
One other additional requirement is satisfaction of accreditation rules. They are defined in 
ISO17020 family of standards. Most requirements for process assessment are same as for 
management system standards (for example ISO 9001). Assessment process must be 
documented and include competence requirements. Assessment must contain audit trail 
between assessment phases and intermediate results. Finally, if assessment leads to process 
certificate, it must be publicly available for intended audience.  
Most of accreditation requirements are built in process assessment standards and models. 
Both SPICE and CMMI model families have such guidance. A specific variant of full-scale 
process assessment is use of CMMI safety extension as a reference model [+SAFE]. It has 
two process areas focused on safety, namely Safety Management and Safety Engineering. 
 Fig. 4. Stakeholders, their main activities and typical workflow in qualification/certification 
oriented process assessment and conformance evaluation 
 
ISO working group for process assessment [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC7/WG10] is developing a new 
reference and assessment model for safety related software domain, called ISO/IEC 15504 
Part 10: Safety extension [ISO/IEC 15504-10]. The assessment model includes three new 
processes to be assessed. Two processes, Safety Management and Safety Engineering, follow 
the contents of CMMI safety extension. The third process, Tool Qualification, explicitly 
stresses the importance of the tools used to build safety related software. The assessment 
model is aligned with some selected safety standards. At the time of writing those are 
ISO/IEC 26262, IEC 61508, IEC 60880 and UK MoD Def Stan 00-56. In addition to the new 
processes, there will be also guidance on how to interpret software engineering processes of 
ISO/IEC 15504-5 and -6 in an assessment in safety related domain. 
 
4.4 Gap fulfilment assessment 
Third basic type of process assessment in CERFAS context is check of process improvements 
needed to get product certificate. This is needed in such cases that software is incomplete or 
erroneous during any phase of certification. Typical example could be design errors found 
during independent tests. Then the software organisation needs to change specification 
and/or design process so that errors can be prevented in advance or detected during design 
phase. Typical process improvement would be better inspection or quality assurance during 
early phases of software lifecycle. Sometimes also more formal process would be needed, 
maybe with model checking type quality assurance. These changes in development process 
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must be verified, and one easy and straightforward way is focused process assessment. 
There is nothing specific compared to normal SPICE – type process assessment in this phase.  
 
4.5 Consolidation of process assessment in safety case analysis 
In many industry areas, including nuclear industry, the safety of the system is documented 
in one or more safety cases. Bishop et al. define safety case as “A documented body of 
evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for 
a given application in a given environment” [Bishop1998]. One of the key characteristics 
common to safety case and process assessment is that they both rely on objective evidences. 
Typically these evidences are more or less the same ones, but assessment and safety case 
might look after different aspects from the evidence. For example for code review report, 
process assessment view might see that the review is done according to process, software 
measurement view calculates the total coverage of code review and module testing, and 
competence view checks if the reviewers have had appropriate skills for the task, as shown 
in Figure 5. 
Assessment result as such (full or partial result sets, or risk analysis based on the gaps) can 
also be used as evidence in safety case, claiming that system is (or is not) programmed 
properly, and thus increase the confidence that the overall system is (or is not) safe. For 
example, one might be more confident on the quality of the end product, if engineering 
processes are at capability level 3 rather than 1. 
 
 Fig. 5. Same evidences are consolidated into different modules for certification. The final 
claim that system is (or is not) safe consists of one or more safety cases. 
How the actual consolidation is done is still in a conceptual phase. Any of the standards 
does not give detailed requirements. For example, they can require a certain metric to be 
collected, but the target values of the metrics are not defined. Also, the modules in Figure 5 
could be arranged and linked in many ways, for example so that the “final result” would be 
Software Assurance Case. 
 
5. Product safety evaluation with Tiira method 
5.1 General 
The starting point for safety analysis in TVO SWEP method is PHA (Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis). It defines the need for evidences to achieve required detection level for potential 
failures. 
Tiira starts during or after the requirements specification phase. FMECA is used in 
requirements specification phase because it is important to  
 evaluate as early as possible the failure modes of the I&C system/software in 
design and development project. The later the phase, the more difficult it is to find 
consequences of the failure mode and so estimate risk. 
 follow the detection of potential software defects in sequential phases of design 
and implementation. Note. See later slides for the concept of detection.  
 identify highest contributor to failures and follow how they are eliminated. This 
also means on early concentration of important factors of safety related failure 
modes.  
 identify for reducing probability of failure occurring.  
In TVO SWEP there are two important specialties of occurrence of causes of failure modes. 
The first, occurrence is related only to the hardware faults. Hardware faults are not analyzed 
by Tiira, meanwhile, it is presupposed that occurrence of the I&C system will be calculated 
and the target value (SIL) is replaced as occurrence number. The second, systematic errors 
are analyzed by Tiira with the concept of detection.  
 
5.2 Basic principles to perform Tiira 
Tiira is a risk-driven analysis tool with which we can identify failure modes of I&C systems 
caused by potential software faults. In addition to failure modes, Tiira identifies potential 
effects and causes, and means to mitigate risk.  
In Tiira, so called APN (Action Priority Number) is used [ref. FMECA IEC 60812]. APN is 
composed of three numbers: Severity (SEV), Occurrence (OCC) and Detection (DET). 
Numbers SEV and OCC are determined from plant or equipment under control. The 
number DET is determined in knowledge how well we can observe occurrence of the 
potential failure mode due to software fault. Many factors affect to the number DET, e.g. 
capability of development process, test processes, and test results (coverage), designs (fault 
tolerance, fault avoidance, etc.). The number DET is the most important APN factor 
controlled by Tiira.  
 
5.3 FMECA sheet used in Tiira  
The set of hypothetical failure modes is reduced to a set of meaningful failure modes by 
discarding those for which the APN is enough low. 
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must be verified, and one easy and straightforward way is focused process assessment. 
There is nothing specific compared to normal SPICE – type process assessment in this phase.  
 
4.5 Consolidation of process assessment in safety case analysis 
In many industry areas, including nuclear industry, the safety of the system is documented 
in one or more safety cases. Bishop et al. define safety case as “A documented body of 
evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for 
a given application in a given environment” [Bishop1998]. One of the key characteristics 
common to safety case and process assessment is that they both rely on objective evidences. 
Typically these evidences are more or less the same ones, but assessment and safety case 
might look after different aspects from the evidence. For example for code review report, 
process assessment view might see that the review is done according to process, software 
measurement view calculates the total coverage of code review and module testing, and 
competence view checks if the reviewers have had appropriate skills for the task, as shown 
in Figure 5. 
Assessment result as such (full or partial result sets, or risk analysis based on the gaps) can 
also be used as evidence in safety case, claiming that system is (or is not) programmed 
properly, and thus increase the confidence that the overall system is (or is not) safe. For 
example, one might be more confident on the quality of the end product, if engineering 
processes are at capability level 3 rather than 1. 
 
 Fig. 5. Same evidences are consolidated into different modules for certification. The final 
claim that system is (or is not) safe consists of one or more safety cases. 
How the actual consolidation is done is still in a conceptual phase. Any of the standards 
does not give detailed requirements. For example, they can require a certain metric to be 
collected, but the target values of the metrics are not defined. Also, the modules in Figure 5 
could be arranged and linked in many ways, for example so that the “final result” would be 
Software Assurance Case. 
 
5. Product safety evaluation with Tiira method 
5.1 General 
The starting point for safety analysis in TVO SWEP method is PHA (Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis). It defines the need for evidences to achieve required detection level for potential 
failures. 
Tiira starts during or after the requirements specification phase. FMECA is used in 
requirements specification phase because it is important to  
 evaluate as early as possible the failure modes of the I&C system/software in 
design and development project. The later the phase, the more difficult it is to find 
consequences of the failure mode and so estimate risk. 
 follow the detection of potential software defects in sequential phases of design 
and implementation. Note. See later slides for the concept of detection.  
 identify highest contributor to failures and follow how they are eliminated. This 
also means on early concentration of important factors of safety related failure 
modes.  
 identify for reducing probability of failure occurring.  
In TVO SWEP there are two important specialties of occurrence of causes of failure modes. 
The first, occurrence is related only to the hardware faults. Hardware faults are not analyzed 
by Tiira, meanwhile, it is presupposed that occurrence of the I&C system will be calculated 
and the target value (SIL) is replaced as occurrence number. The second, systematic errors 
are analyzed by Tiira with the concept of detection.  
 
5.2 Basic principles to perform Tiira 
Tiira is a risk-driven analysis tool with which we can identify failure modes of I&C systems 
caused by potential software faults. In addition to failure modes, Tiira identifies potential 
effects and causes, and means to mitigate risk.  
In Tiira, so called APN (Action Priority Number) is used [ref. FMECA IEC 60812]. APN is 
composed of three numbers: Severity (SEV), Occurrence (OCC) and Detection (DET). 
Numbers SEV and OCC are determined from plant or equipment under control. The 
number DET is determined in knowledge how well we can observe occurrence of the 
potential failure mode due to software fault. Many factors affect to the number DET, e.g. 
capability of development process, test processes, and test results (coverage), designs (fault 
tolerance, fault avoidance, etc.). The number DET is the most important APN factor 
controlled by Tiira.  
 
5.3 FMECA sheet used in Tiira  
The set of hypothetical failure modes is reduced to a set of meaningful failure modes by 
discarding those for which the APN is enough low. 
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Based on original safety requirements, each potential failure is classified according to its 
severity, using for example 1 – 5 scale. Similarly, also the probability of occurrence and 
required detection rate are classified 1 – 5. SIL levels from IEC/EN 61508 are used as a 
reference to map each safety function and its required detection rate. As a result, these 
factors are multiplied into APN number. The calculated APN for each potential failure 
indicates, how much evidence is needed to achieve acceptable level of failure detection and 
so the APN as a whole. Figures 6 and 7 explain in more details most important method 
features. 
Figure 6 presents a Tiira sheet with one example. Explanations of existing conditions per 
column are:  
 8. Severity number SEV: ”How bad are the consequences of the failure mode?” 
 9. Occurrence number OCC: ”What are the chances of the failure mode or the cause 
actually happening?” In Tiira-table, OCC-number is provided mainly for 
electronic, mechanics, etc.  
 10. Detection number DET: ”What is the chance of catching the failure mode before 
it reaches the next operation or the customer?” For occurrence of software faults, 
DET-number is most important because control actions have impact on it more 
than SEV and OCC. In fact, SEV number remains the same during analysis. 
 11. Action Priority Number = SEV x OCC x DET 
  
1
Ref.
2 
Entry
code
3
Potential 
failure mode (FM)
4
Effect
on
5 
Potential
effect (E)
6
Potential
cause (C)
7
Risk
controls (RC)
8
Sev
9
Occ
10
Det
11
APN
12
Recommended
action
13 
Action taken
14
Sev
15
Occ
16
Det
17
APN
General 0 The irradiated fuel is 
too near the w ater 
surface of the pool
Safety Danger of 
radiation for 
people at the 
pool
1. Operator drives 
the w agon too 
near the surface
2. Risk Controls 
are failed
1. Failure detection 
by operator at the 
pool, DET-1
2. Manual 
emergency stop, 
OCC-½
3. Hardw ired 
emergency stop, 
OCC-1
4. Mechanical stop, 
OCC-1
5. Position alarm of 
the mechanical 
stop, DET-½
6. Brake system
7. Radiation alarm, 
DET-½
8. Lock keys
5 2,5 3 37,5 1. Position 
detection of the 
mechanical stop
2. Radiation 
protection
3. Programmable 
safety stop
1-3: OCC-1
For further SW error 
detection evaluation, 
DET-1
5 1,5 2 15
 Fig. 6. Use of severity, occurrence and detection variables to calculate APN. An example of 
one potential failure mode is presented just for illustration. 
 
Figure 6 has one example potential failure mode. Analysis of it gives result APN value 37,5. 
Highest acceptable value is 25 using 1 – 5 scale, because result of maximum values in SEV x 
OCC x DET equation is 5 x 5 x 1 = 25. So, some additional controls are needed. They are 
specified in columns 12 and 13, leading to new APN value 15, which is acceptable. As seen 
from columns 15 and 16, both OCC and DET values have been changed to reach accepted 
value.  
 
5.3 Evidence collection and analysis in Detection Table 
Figure 7 is a sample from a so called Detection Table of the TVO SWEP method. Figure 7 
shows only app. 40 lines from total of 200 items to improve failure detection. The full 
Detection Table covers software life cycle and related QA and V&V activities. It covers also 
all SPICE processes in table 1. 
Total reduction detection number: 1
APPLICATION
Total average 0,72 0,71
Factors for verification rate 0,93 0,93
r Size of the project 1 1
r Degree of complexity of the design 1 1
r Degree of novelty of the design 1 1
r Degree of novelty of the technology 0,66 0,66
r SIL 1 1
Verification of deriving the I&C requirements 0,92 0,66
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.1 Req.s elicitation 0,66 0,66
r Walkthrough of functional, performance and independence re 1 0,66
r Walkthrough of the categorisation requirements, interfaces, u 1 0,66
r Walkthrough of plant constraints 1 0,66
Verification of I&C specification 0,83 0,77
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.2 System requirements analysis 0,91 0,91
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.3 System architecture design 0,92 0,92
r Walktrough of the I&C architecture 1 1
r Walktrough of functions assignment 1 1
r Walktrough of required analysis 0,33 NA
o Formalised descriptions of system specification
o Review of traceability and consistence (TA)
Verification of system detailed design and implementation 0,00 0,00
r Walktrough of system design NA NA
r Walktrough of system implementation NA NA
o Review of traceability (TA)
Verification of SW Requirements Specification, SRS 0,96 0,96
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.4 Software requirements analysis 0,88 0,88
r Walkthrough of SRS 1 1
r Walkthrough of interfaces with HW, users, etc. 1 1
o Analysis of SRS (Formalised descriptions)
o Prototyping of SRS requirements
o Review of traceability (TA)
Verification of system test plans 1,00 1,00
r Inspection of test plan 1 1
o Review of traceability (TA)
Verification of SW Design Specification, SDS 0,76 0,54
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.5 Software design 0,91 0,91
r Review of SDS (Walkthrough or Inspection) 0,66 0,66
r Assessment of performance parameters (Proto) 0,66 0
r Traceability of allocated functions (TA) 0,66 0
r Assessment of data required (Inspection) 0,66 1
r Analysis of fault tolerance (Inspection) 1 0,66  Fig. 7. A sample from an Excel based checklist to calculate detection index DET. An example 
is presented just for illustration. 
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Based on original safety requirements, each potential failure is classified according to its 
severity, using for example 1 – 5 scale. Similarly, also the probability of occurrence and 
required detection rate are classified 1 – 5. SIL levels from IEC/EN 61508 are used as a 
reference to map each safety function and its required detection rate. As a result, these 
factors are multiplied into APN number. The calculated APN for each potential failure 
indicates, how much evidence is needed to achieve acceptable level of failure detection and 
so the APN as a whole. Figures 6 and 7 explain in more details most important method 
features. 
Figure 6 presents a Tiira sheet with one example. Explanations of existing conditions per 
column are:  
 8. Severity number SEV: ”How bad are the consequences of the failure mode?” 
 9. Occurrence number OCC: ”What are the chances of the failure mode or the cause 
actually happening?” In Tiira-table, OCC-number is provided mainly for 
electronic, mechanics, etc.  
 10. Detection number DET: ”What is the chance of catching the failure mode before 
it reaches the next operation or the customer?” For occurrence of software faults, 
DET-number is most important because control actions have impact on it more 
than SEV and OCC. In fact, SEV number remains the same during analysis. 
 11. Action Priority Number = SEV x OCC x DET 
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detection of the 
mechanical stop
2. Radiation 
protection
3. Programmable 
safety stop
1-3: OCC-1
For further SW error 
detection evaluation, 
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5 1,5 2 15
 Fig. 6. Use of severity, occurrence and detection variables to calculate APN. An example of 
one potential failure mode is presented just for illustration. 
 
Figure 6 has one example potential failure mode. Analysis of it gives result APN value 37,5. 
Highest acceptable value is 25 using 1 – 5 scale, because result of maximum values in SEV x 
OCC x DET equation is 5 x 5 x 1 = 25. So, some additional controls are needed. They are 
specified in columns 12 and 13, leading to new APN value 15, which is acceptable. As seen 
from columns 15 and 16, both OCC and DET values have been changed to reach accepted 
value.  
 
5.3 Evidence collection and analysis in Detection Table 
Figure 7 is a sample from a so called Detection Table of the TVO SWEP method. Figure 7 
shows only app. 40 lines from total of 200 items to improve failure detection. The full 
Detection Table covers software life cycle and related QA and V&V activities. It covers also 
all SPICE processes in table 1. 
Total reduction detection number: 1
APPLICATION
Total average 0,72 0,71
Factors for verification rate 0,93 0,93
r Size of the project 1 1
r Degree of complexity of the design 1 1
r Degree of novelty of the design 1 1
r Degree of novelty of the technology 0,66 0,66
r SIL 1 1
Verification of deriving the I&C requirements 0,92 0,66
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.1 Req.s elicitation 0,66 0,66
r Walkthrough of functional, performance and independence re 1 0,66
r Walkthrough of the categorisation requirements, interfaces, u 1 0,66
r Walkthrough of plant constraints 1 0,66
Verification of I&C specification 0,83 0,77
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.2 System requirements analysis 0,91 0,91
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.3 System architecture design 0,92 0,92
r Walktrough of the I&C architecture 1 1
r Walktrough of functions assignment 1 1
r Walktrough of required analysis 0,33 NA
o Formalised descriptions of system specification
o Review of traceability and consistence (TA)
Verification of system detailed design and implementation 0,00 0,00
r Walktrough of system design NA NA
r Walktrough of system implementation NA NA
o Review of traceability (TA)
Verification of SW Requirements Specification, SRS 0,96 0,96
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.4 Software requirements analysis 0,88 0,88
r Walkthrough of SRS 1 1
r Walkthrough of interfaces with HW, users, etc. 1 1
o Analysis of SRS (Formalised descriptions)
o Prototyping of SRS requirements
o Review of traceability (TA)
Verification of system test plans 1,00 1,00
r Inspection of test plan 1 1
o Review of traceability (TA)
Verification of SW Design Specification, SDS 0,76 0,54
SPICE Pre-Q of the process, ENG.5 Software design 0,91 0,91
r Review of SDS (Walkthrough or Inspection) 0,66 0,66
r Assessment of performance parameters (Proto) 0,66 0
r Traceability of allocated functions (TA) 0,66 0
r Assessment of data required (Inspection) 0,66 1
r Analysis of fault tolerance (Inspection) 1 0,66  Fig. 7. A sample from an Excel based checklist to calculate detection index DET. An example 
is presented just for illustration. 
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Detection Table summarizes qualification findings in a composite index called “Total 
detection number DET”. The idea is to use DET index as load or backing evidence in 
FMECA sheet (Column 10 – Column 16 in Figure 6). The table is separate for Pre-
Qualification and Qualification phases. In most cases it is also separate for Platform and 
Application. Evidence in each phase is gathered by process evaluation (SPICE) and product 
safety evaluation (FMECA). Also compliance with nuclear specific standards is taken into 
account here.  
SPICE capability level is converted to capability index, which summarizes detailed practice 
ratings at levels 1 – 3 for each process. It is normalized to get values between 0 – 1 for each 
capability level. Other evidences are detailed requirements from V&V processes, as defined 
in IAEA report no. 384 [6]. 
In the example of Figure 7, we present two columns for DET and its inputs. The right 
column is for the pre-qualification phase and the left column for the additional nuclear 
specific verification of the application. The pre-qualified system was in this case a radiation 
monitoring equipment. As seen in the example, also NA (Not Applicable) rating is allowed 
and used, if relevant input data or rating result is not available. Similar table is often needed 
also for the software platform.  
In most cases the Severity and Occurrence parameters remain the same and only failure 
detection rate can be improved. As a result, Action Priority Number APN may reach an 
acceptable level. In our example (see columns 11 and 17 in figure 6) the goal was that each 
potential failure has APN value 25 or less. In our example that is the case, and the 
qualification has been successful. DET value has changed from 3 to 2, and Detection Table in 
figure 7 shows that we have achieved this one level reduction by a large amount of 
evidences and actions.  
Finally, the aim is to determine the Reduction Detection Number RDN. RDN is typically a 
difference between DET number at FMECA table (see columns 10 and 16 in Figure 6 as an 
example). RDN can get a value 0 – 4. The Detection Table calculates the value of RDN 
automatically, based on the SPICE and V&V evidences. Calculated RND value is then used 
in Tiira FMECA table to reduce Detection rate. The index limits for for RDN value 0 - 4 are: 
<0.60, 0.60 – 0.74, 0.75 – 0.89, 0.90 – 0.98. 0.99 – 1.0. 
 
6. Certification to support qualification 
In Finland, a type acceptance certificate is required mainly in highest safety class of I&C 
equipments and systems in Nuclear Power Plants, and recommended in lowest safety 
classes. In the research project “Certification facilities for software (CERFAS)”, the objective 
is to develop a Software Certification Service, SCS, able to certificate safety critical software 
for the demands in Finnish nuclear area. The framework of SCS is described in Figure 8.  
Certification can be defined as “the process of assessing whether an asset conforms to 
predetermined certification criteria appropriate for that class of asset” [10]. This idea of 
conformance with criteria is the fundamental principle of certification. Certification is 
documenting compliance of a product and product development process to a standard such 
as IEC 60880 and IEC 61508 within a defined but possibly broad set of potential applications.  
In general, certification is seen in CERFAS as a service to support qualification and further 
licensing (Figure 8). Qualification includes a system qualification and an application 
qualification. The system qualification is documenting a justifiable argument to attain an 
operating license for the complete realized system. On the other hand, the application 
qualification is documenting functional safety suitability for a specific system product in a 
specific target application.  
Various areas of methods, standards and justification means are needed to support 
certification. Some examples are process assessment, product evaluation and use of different 
analyses and tests. For certification, an accredited Certification Body is needed. Type testing 
or other kind of Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is typically a fundamental 
part of the certification. Any CB needs a variety of services to run a certification service and 
to integrate different approaches as a coherent system.  
Each certification type has its own assessment elements. The framework in CERFAS 
assumes that certification is based on some reference model, norm or set of criteria. 
Certificate itself is then a conformance statement against those requirements. Typically, such 
statement is justified by some methods, which include external audits, IV&V’s, reviews and 
inspections, code analysis and type tests. Safety cases provide a formal argument to justify 
that a system is safe [11]. 
 
 Fig. 8. CERFAS gives facilities for SCS including Certification Bodies and evaluators. 
Conformance to standards or other predetermined criteria is fundamental principle of 
certification.  
 
7. Conclusions and future developments 
Several real-life qualifications are already done by using TVO SWEP method. The goals of 
the method are achieved well, and the pre-qualification is effective. It is evident that TVO 
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for the demands in Finnish nuclear area. The framework of SCS is described in Figure 8.  
Certification can be defined as “the process of assessing whether an asset conforms to 
predetermined certification criteria appropriate for that class of asset” [10]. This idea of 
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documenting compliance of a product and product development process to a standard such 
as IEC 60880 and IEC 61508 within a defined but possibly broad set of potential applications.  
In general, certification is seen in CERFAS as a service to support qualification and further 
licensing (Figure 8). Qualification includes a system qualification and an application 
qualification. The system qualification is documenting a justifiable argument to attain an 
operating license for the complete realized system. On the other hand, the application 
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SWEP needs still refinements and additional validation. Main difficulty is to collect 
evidences so systematically, that the necessary calculations and reports could be done as 
automatically as possible. Then the main focus can be in professional topics and may lead to 
useful win-win findings between TVO and the supplier. 
Additional methods for software certification are also validated with real life cases. 
Certification is needed mainly in safety-critical systems. Attention is more in product 
evaluation than process assessment. Evaluation process is quite rigor and formal. Main form 
of results has been safety case, which quantifies all kind of evidences.  
Other industries may have quite similar needs for qualification as nuclear power plants. For 
example control of railway and metro networks and traffic, electro medical devices like 
patient control systems and many military systems could be users of our method. Many 
standards are also under development, and can be seen as “second generation” of safety-
critical systems. Some examples are ISO 26262 for vehicle industry and European standards 
for space industry (ECSS).  
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